

Hope for Cities or Hope for People: Neighborhood Development and Demographic Change

Jelisa Clark and Cynthia Negrey
University of Louisville

This study, recognizing the longstanding criticisms of HOPE VI as a vehicle for gentrification, compares the goals of local officials with the stated goals of HOPE VI in order to investigate the extent to which local officials are using or misusing HOPE VI to achieve local development and revitalization goals. HOPE VI positioned itself as a program intended to deconcentrate poverty, however, in the case of Liberty Green, the focus on neighborhood development embedded within the federal policy results in HOPE VI developments being described as successful based on physical changes at the site rather than outcomes for public housing residents, who largely do not benefit from these changes. Evidence from this study suggests that most of the emphasis for the Liberty Green HOPE VI development revolves around neighborhood and community development goals. And self-sufficiency, while a goal of the HOPE VI program, remains secondary.

INTRODUCTION

Vale (2013) described public housing as a triple social experiment. During the first phase, 1935–1960, public housing served upwardly mobile working class families. However, from 1960 to 1990, the number of people living in high poverty metropolitan areas increased 54 percent (Katz, 2009). In the second phase, the issue of urban poverty garnered more attention than ever before, and due to the high concentration of poor households living in public housing the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was primed to act. HUD underwent an ideological change wherein the goal of public housing was expanded to include building community and eliminating poverty (Katz, 2009). Since the 1990s public housing has entered a third phase and returned to serving a less poor constituency (Vale, 2013). This has been achieved largely through the HOPE VI program, which provided public housing authorities (PHAs) with funds to demolish old public housing stock and build mixed-income communities.

The logic underlying HOPE VI was heavily influenced by the work of William Julius Wilson (1987), which suggested that the effects of concentrated poverty were exacerbated by social isolation. HOPE VI, drawing on theories of social isolation and neighborhood effects, was designed to achieve the goals of building community and eliminating poverty by developing mixed-income neighborhoods. An embedded assumption of HOPE VI is

Correspondence should be addressed to Jelisa Clark, Department of Sociology, University of Louisville, 103 Lutz Hall, Louisville, KY 40292; clnegr01@louisville.edu.

City & Community 16:2 June 2017
doi: 10.1111/cico.12236

© 2017 American Sociological Association, 1430 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20005

that mixed-income neighborhoods would help alleviate the problems of concentrated poverty. Outcomes of HOPE VI, however, do not consistently show evidence of deconcentration of poverty and improved resident self-sufficiency. The change in demographics of many HOPE VI developments has led many to criticize HOPE VI for relying on design principals and potentially spurring gentrification.

Demolition of public housing has been most aggressive in cities where market pressure for gentrification has been most intense (Goetz, 2011), and areas that were able to attract private investment have been given preference (Duryea, 2006; Goetz, 2011; Harvard Law Review, 2003; Keene and Geronimus, 2011). In fact, in 1998, the General Accounting Office (GAO) acknowledged that HOPE VI's focus had shifted "from revitalizing the most severely distressed public housing sites to transforming distressed sites with the capacity to leverage outside resources into mixed-income communities" (as quoted in Harvard Law Review, 2003, p. 1484). Public officials favor demolition because it allows for reimagining the city as a safe zone of commerce by erasing stigmatized structures of public housing and opens up land to bring middle- and upper-class families back to the city (Crump, 2002, p. 582; Goetz, 2013). Cunningham (2001) argued that such public-private partnerships had the potential to devastate relatively stable housing projects and displace residents to second-rate housing.

This study is situated within these criticisms of HOPE VI. We are particularly interested in the motives of local officials for redevelopment and which goals of HOPE VI were met. Using Liberty Green (LG) as a case study, we posed the following questions: How did Louisville Metro Housing Authority (LMHA) select the site to apply for a grant? Was the process for selecting the site different than previous HOPE VI developments in Louisville? And most importantly, has LG achieved the goals of HOPE VI? To answer these questions, we compared the stated goals of HOPE VI to the goals of local officials involved in the planning and development of LG. We found that HOPE VI values place outcomes over people outcomes. The LG was considered successful because it met neighborhood development goals. Resident impact was evaluated through neighborhood effects; there is an implicit assumption that residents will benefit because of changes to the neighborhood.

BACKGROUND

HOPE VI, originated as part of the Urban Revitalization Demonstration (URD) under Jack Kemp in the 1990s, became the main avenue for the demolition of public housing until HUD's Choice Neighborhoods program superseded HOPE VI in 2013. In 1989, Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, which investigated the state of public housing over 18 months and concluded that 86,000 of the 1.3 million public housing units were severely distressed. They called for increased funding for support services, the development of mixed-income communities, and rehabilitation and replacement of public housing units in order to eliminate severely distressed housing by 2000 (Katz 2009). The ultimate outcome of the commission was HOPE VI, which provided funding for demolition to public housing authorities (PHAs) that could demonstrate that a housing project was severely distressed. During the life of the program, 262 grants were awarded, amounting to over \$6.2 billion.

Since the benefits of HOPE VI are mostly place-based (i.e., reclaiming particular neighborhoods, reducing criminal activity, and upgrading the physical environment) and in

many areas have spawned or facilitated gentrification (Goetz 2005), it is important to examine the motives of local governments. In answering our research question, two bodies of literature inform an understanding of HOPE VI development efforts: studies of neighborhood effects and deconcentration of poverty. Individuals living in high poverty areas tend to have poor health, educational outcomes, and job opportunities (Goetz 2003). Neighborhood effects (see Goetz 2003; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Wilson 1987), assumes that greater economic diversity in a neighborhood will help ameliorate these problems. Policies and programs, such as Moving to Opportunity (MTO) and HOPE VI, developed beginning in the 1980s were concerned about the effects of concentrated poverty and argued that deconcentrating poverty and promoting mixed-income communities would alleviate the issues surrounding urban poverty.

MTO provided families with housing vouchers, moving assistance, and counseling in order to assess the outcomes of deconcentration. Similarly, under HOPE VI, municipalities relocated public housing residents with housing vouchers and transformed public housing sites into mixed-income developments. Policy makers have rationalized MTO and HOPE VI, like other programs intended to deconcentrate poverty, as an opportunity for individuals to have access to neighborhoods that would enhance employment and educational opportunities and at the same time decrease exposure to violence, crime, and drugs (Clark 2008). This policy assumes proximity to the middle class will yield benefits for lower-income residents; however, proximity does not guarantee social contact, let alone social cohesion (Smith 1999; Tach 2009).

DECONCENTRATING POVERTY

Results of deconcentrating poverty have been varied. Early results of MTO indicated that the experimental group moved to more advantageous neighborhoods, exhibited improved mental and physical health, experienced less criminal victimization, and there were fewer incidences of behavioral problems for girls (Clark 2008; Stal and Zuberi 2010). At the time of the interim report, 4–7 years later, the positive effects of MTO had faded as individuals made additional location choices (Clark 2008; Stal and Zuberi 2010). Ten to fifteen years after randomization, MTO-assisted moves were associated with improved adult mental and physical health outcomes; however, there were no consistent detectable impacts on adult economic self-sufficiency or children’s educational achievement outcomes (Ludwig et al. 2013). Recent results, however, found that moving to a lower poverty neighborhood under the age of 13 improved college attendance and earnings (Chetty et al. 2016).

Results from other deconcentration efforts indicate that residents from severely distressed neighborhoods tend to relocate into nearby neighborhoods a median distance of 2.9 miles (Burton et al. 2013; Jacob 2004; Keene and Geronimus 2011; Kingsley et al. 2003; Oakely et al. 2011). The average poverty rate for HOPE VI households relocating using Section 8 dropped from 61 percent to 27 percent (Kingsley et al. 2003). These averages have the potential to mask the actual variation in the distribution in poverty rates. The average poverty rates of new neighborhoods were below 20 percent in 12 cities and above 30 percent in seven cities (Kingsley et al. 2003). While individuals move to lower poverty neighborhoods, the poverty rates of the new neighborhoods are typically higher than average for cities (Boston 2005; Burton et al. 2002; Fraser et al. 2004; Goetz 2003).

Often times the destination neighborhoods are not much better than the original residence (Buron et al. 2007). The gains that relocatees make are fragile, and many experience material hardship such as paying utilities, and other challenges such as dealing with landlords, and tenant screening (Buron et al. 2007; Buron et al. 2013; Brooks et al. 2005). Residential instability is also an issue for some relocatees; 40 percent who moved with vouchers moved again within two years (Brooks et al. 2005; Buron et al. 2007). These subsequent moves have been found to be associated with both neighborhoods with growing poverty and/or residential segregation (Goetz 2003; Sharkey 2012) and reduced exposure to high poverty rates (Comey 2007). The work of both Boston (2005) and Jacob (2004) highlights that whether or not relocatees are exposed to less poverty does not necessarily translate into self-sufficiency or increased educational attainment.

There have been some positive reports of deconcentration efforts; 41 percent of those who relocated with housing vouchers stated that their overall financial situations had improved (Brooks et al. 2005). However, it appears that the majority of the benefits of demolition go to cities by improving the appearance of concentrated poverty neighborhoods, and by reducing poverty rates, crime, and attendant social ills. Approximately four out of five families displaced by HOPE VI do not return to the site to live, as such they do not experience the community level benefits generated by HOPE VI, but residents of the surrounding community, investors, property owners, public officials, and new residents do (Goetz 2013). The studies discussed here suggest that neighborhood benefits do not translate into benefits for many of the individuals impacted by HOPE VI demolitions.

According to Vale (2013), we can better understand the meaning of public housing by examining the design politics imbued in design and development efforts. The decision to clear a site and start over is not only an aesthetic judgment, but it is also a political act. The original HOPE VI Notice of Funding Availability required winners to heed the economic and social needs of residents in addition to the physical condition of housing. However, few actually return due to the reduced number of subsidized units and other factors such as strict eligibility requirements (Tach 2009). Design plays a role in who public housing serves. When a public housing authority decides to forego one-for-one replacement or chooses to emphasize two-bedroom units rather than four-bedroom units they make a political decision about the constituency they will serve (Vale 2013).

MIXED-INCOME DEVELOPMENTS

We situate our examination of HOPE VI within the mixed-income impetus that undergirds the program. Mixed-income development is a strategy for addressing both concentrated poverty and urban redevelopment. Theoretical assumptions that underlie mixed-income development focus on socioeconomic mixing (Chaskin and Joseph 2013). Mixed-income endeavors assume that neighborhood level factors indirectly impact individual outcomes (Cheshire 2012; Goetz 2010; Manley et al. 2012; Oakely et al. 2011). The assumption is that by integrating public housing residents into more stable neighborhoods they will have an opportunity for a better quality of life and social mobility (Chaskin and Joseph 2015). However, HOPE VI as a federal policy and the HOPE VI developments themselves do not attend to how or why cross-class interactions would emerge (Fraser et al. 2013). In fact, these developments may offer little more than the illusion of integration or what could be called incorporated exclusion (Chaskin and Joseph 2015).

The development of mixed-income communities to address concentrated poverty applies spatial solutions to complex social problems (Chaskin and Joseph 2015). These developments are less about reducing poverty and more about redeveloping the inner-city in a manner that is profitable and politically viable (Goetz 2013; Joseph et al. 2007). Fraser et al. (2013) contend that HOPE VI cannot be accepted as a strategy to ameliorate poverty. It may even exacerbate poverty as the shift in housing policy has resulted in a massive reduction of public housing stock and increased wait lists for housing assistance (Pardee and Gotham 2005). Furthermore, while HOPE VI required Community and Supportive Services (CSS), evidence suggests that they are not effective in making meaningful changes in employment and wealth accumulation for residents. Because of the overall low educational attainment, job-training programs tend to prepare residents for lower wage and semiskilled jobs that are usually inadequate to help residents move into self-sufficiency (Oakely et al. 2015).

Current policy rationales are mostly in line with the goals and motivation of the city but incongruent with perceptions residents have of their prereslocation home and neighborhood (Lucio et al. 2014). These policies not only have substantial cost, but they have the potential to destroy established social capital of low-income residents. Although low-income people tend to have limited social networks that are ineffective for social leverage (Curley 2009; Goetz 2003), they have access to social support such as informal childcare, are more tightly knit, and have higher frequencies of intense contact (Laakso 2013; Manzo et al. 2008). When residents are forced to move from their neighborhoods, they lose some social capital that they had built with their neighbors in efforts to develop social leverage.

LIBERTY GREEN

LG was rebuilt over Clarksdale, which was 65 years old at the time of demolition and had 713 units (Downs 2012; Stone et al. 2011). The population of Clarksdale was 97 percent African American, and 87 percent were female heads of household (Stone et al. 2011, p. 7). Media accounts described Clarksdale as being troubled by poverty and crime such as drugs and prostitution. Louisville Metro Housing Authority (LMHA), formerly Housing Authority of Louisville (HAL), received the HOPE VI grant in 2003 and began demolition that same year. New construction for LG began in 2005, occupancy began spring 2006, and construction was completed in 2009. The development cost \$233 million (LMHA 2014). By the end of 2007, 41 percent of former Clarksdale residents were relocated to other public housing units, 12 percent were living in scattered sites, 26.5 percent were using housing vouchers, 1.5 percent were living in LG, and there was no data on the remaining 19 percent (Stone et al. 2011).

Lessons from Park Duvalle, a HOPE VI development that replaced Cotter and Lang Homes in Louisville, informed the implementation at LG. Based on complaints about the lack of social services, LMHA emphasized Community Support Services (CSS), which was designed to reflect the needs and goals of Clarksdale residents. Programming included tutoring/mentoring, youth programming, GED training, computer classes, vocational training, homeownership counseling, and assistance obtaining medical and construction jobs. In addition, a new concept middle school, Nativity School, was built in conjunction with the Archdiocese of Louisville and St. Boniface Parish (Stone et al. 2011). Stone et al.

(2011) found that a significant proportion of displaced Clarksdale residents improved their level of education, and there was a lower proportion of residents with below poverty incomes at follow up interviews after the rehabilitation.

METHODS

We pose three questions about the LG case: How did LMHA select the Clarksdale site to apply for a HOPE VI grant? Was the process for selecting Clarksdale different than when Cotter and Lang Homes were selected for redevelopment? To date, has LG achieved the goals of HOPE VI? These questions were designed to assess the city's motives in regards to the development of LG and to determine which goals were met with the demolition of Clarksdale. LG is a prime case to investigate because of the changing housing market in downtown Louisville, and the presence of a previous HOPE VI development (Park DuValle in 1996) allows for comparison of LMHA's rationale in choosing Clarksdale for the HOPE VI grant in 2002. Using interviews, content analysis, and census data, this study investigates the objectives of local officials in comparison to the following objectives of HOPE VI: changing the physical shape of public housing; lessening the concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in nonpoverty neighborhoods and promoting mixed-income communities; establishing positive incentive for self-sufficiency and comprehensive services that empower residents; and forging partnerships with other agencies, local governments, nonprofit organizations, and private businesses to leverage support and resources (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2012).

Nine interviews, consisting of open-ended questions, were conducted by the first author during summer 2013 with local stakeholders and government officials, including affiliates from LMHA, HUD, Louisville Metro government, and a local nonprofit focused on fair and affordable housing. Eleven respondents were identified during preliminary research on LG and an additional individual was identified by snowball sampling. All content on LG and Clarksdale in *Louisville Business First*, a local monthly, from 2001 to 2013, summing to 71 articles, was analyzed, as was the grant application. Interviews and documents were coded and analyzed according to grounded theory techniques by the first author (Charmaz 2006). Two major themes emerged. First, the goals of HOPE VI as implemented in LG revolved around neighborhood development goals. Meeting neighborhood development goals took into account the physical distress of the development, but the surrounding community and ability to leverage private funds was crucial to selecting LG for HOPE VI. Second, development was deemed successful based on an assessment of neighborhood effects and not whether public housing residents were better off.

Data from the 2000 census (census tract 59), before construction of LG began, and five-year estimates from the 2010 ACS were used to examine changes in race, income, educational attainment, employment status, female-headed households, and poverty. Data from the Louisville Metro Police Department, obtained via an open records request, track changes in crime before and after the development of LG. We examined the total number of crimes committed each year between 2003 and 2010 in the city of Louisville and in each of the five police divisions where a public housing development was located. We also assessed LG's impact on commercial development. New businesses registered with the Louisville Metro Revenue Commission between 2003 and 2012 were filtered to those with addresses in the 40202 zip code, wherein Clarksdale was located. Although this zip

code extends well beyond the borders of Clarksdale/LG, it captures the site's location within downtown Louisville.

ANALYSIS

LG sits in the midst of downtown industry, retail shops, and burgeoning residential development, with a major regional medical center to the south and the trendy NULU neighborhood to the north. The area surrounding LG has undergone some major changes over the course of the past few decades. Clarksdale, the previous version of the neighborhood, was once isolated from the neighboring community, whereas LG has been integrated into the community. LMHA and the University of Louisville partnered together to include housing for medical students in the area. NULU Edge Food Market, named after the adjacent neighborhood, opened in summer 2013 and symbolizes LG's embeddedness in the surrounding community. The changes that have accompanied the development of LG reflect the ideological change that spurred the HOPE VI program and that has guided federal public housing policy.

One of the concerns with HOPE VI developments is that they could potentially spur gentrification. In assessing how the goals of local officials compare to the stated goals of HOPE VI, we found that local officials did not necessarily have ulterior motives for the HOPE VI development, but the goals of the HOPE VI program itself are at times contradictory. According to a local representative from HUD, HOPE VI had "a statutory goal to tear down a specific number of public housing units." In meeting this goal and demolishing public housing, there is a potential for residents to be displaced or affected negatively in other ways. When asked about the goals of HOPE VI, seven of nine participants referred to some form of neighborhood development benefit as part of the overall plan. At the same time, respondents and the grant application expressed concerns that the redevelopment of a site might negatively impact the lives of those who lived there, however, that concern did not impede the overall perception of success. In reviewing the data, neighborhood development goals and the impact on residents are in constant tension during the implementation of HOPE VI at Clarksdale/LG.

NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT

In the executive summary of the grant application, LMHA states, "The goal of the Clarksdale Plan is to utilize its location as an asset and develop a community with a vastly heightened livability for its residents and its neighborhoods" (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002). Here, LMHA makes it clear that neighborhood development is key. First and foremost, we see that the goal of the revitalization is about community development; residents are secondary. Since residents are a secondary concern, it is important to ask whom this new community benefits. It is largely not Clarksdale residents, as only 1.5 percent returned.

In discussing the need for revitalization at Clarksdale, the grant narrative reveals that the negative impact on the surrounding community plays just as important a role as the amount of physical distress at the site. Clarksdale had numerous structural and social problems such as mold, lead, a failing boiler system, ponding water, asbestos, trash, rodents, a deteriorated sewer system, and high crime. In fact, the grant application stated

TABLE 1. Comparison of Crime in Neighborhoods with Public Housing

		Crime Rates									
		Clarksdale		Parkway Place		Beecher Terrace		Iroquois		Sheppard Square	
Year	Louisville	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
2003	6,912 ¹	583	8.43	484	7.00	856	12.38	451	6.52	1,253	18.13
2004	29,462	1,118	3.79	905	3.07	1,744	5.92	923	3.13	2,670	9.0
2005	31,342 ²	1,133	3.61	1,087	3.47	1,881	6.00	1,121	3.58	2,927	9.34
2006	32,972	1,076	3.26	1,113	3.38	1,975	5.99	1,428	4.33	3,110	9.43
2007	33,781	1,214	3.59	1,157	3.43	2,308	6.83	1,283	3.80	3,421	10.13
2008	33,726	1,088	3.23	1,083	3.21	2,237	6.63	1,412	4.19	3,198	9.48
2009	30,676	1,057	3.45	1,114	3.63	2,108	6.87	1,331	4.34	3,161	10.30
2010	33,285	1,049	3.15	1,017	3.06	2,344	7.04	1,402	4.21	3,259	9.79

Source: Louisville Metro Police Department

¹Only 3 months reported for the 2003 calendar year; includes Louisville and Jefferson County police departments, which reflect the merger of city and county governments that occurred in 2003.

²Because of changes in reporting practices, 2005 figures are not comparable to previous years' data.

that there were 180 major offenses in 2000 and that crime in Clarksdale was almost four times the rate of the city as a whole (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002). In 2003, a year before work started on LG, crime at Clarksdale accounted for 8.43 percent of all crime in the city of Louisville (see Table 1); however, two other public housing sites, Beecher Terrace and Sheppard Square, accounted for 12.38 percent and 18.13 percent, respectively. If crime was the major redevelopment criterion, then it stands to reason that Sheppard Square should have been selected as a candidate for HOPE VI redevelopment before Clarksdale. Crime is a secondary criterion, and it is viewed in relation to the goal of neighborhood development.

Several participants acknowledged that another site was in worse condition and under consideration at one point. When asked how a housing authority chooses a site to apply for a grant, a representative from the city of Louisville offered:

The public housing unit that should come down before any and all of any of the ones that we took down is the one out on Hill Street (Parkway Place) but it didn't meet the standard because you would never want to rebuild there because it's an industrial area. Are you with me? Park Hill is the one in my judgment that needed to come down before any of these. Cotter and Lang was dang close to being in that bad of shape, but the one on Hill is the toughest.

Another respondent echoed these sentiments, elaborating on the dilemma of whether or not to rebuild at Parkway because of the surrounding industry. For both respondents Parkway Place was just as good a candidate, if not better, for HOPE VI based on physical distress. The major difference between Parkway and Clarksdale was location. Clarksdale was surrounded by a burgeoning downtown, whereas Parkway is surrounded by an industrial area. A fair housing advocate also noted the importance of location:

I do not consider these about the people who live there; nobody who lived there comes back. Really, seriously and if you wanted the worst of the worsts you would have started with Parkway. They didn't want the worst of the worst; they wanted the ones where the real estate had potential value.

Because of Clarksdale's location, demolition had the potential to increase property values in the surrounding area and spur other development. The grant narrative emphasized a redeveloped Clarksdale's potential for "spillover"; it was intended to help create 2000 new housing units in downtown Louisville (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002). Lot selection for off-site development was also intended to contribute to overarching downtown development goals and involved working with the city to include "emerging neighborhoods" where active revitalization was underway.

The Clarksdale Plan fit into existing initiatives to revitalize downtown, including the Downtown Housing Initiative Fund and the 1990 Downtown Development Plan, development at nearby Waterfront Park and Louisville Extreme Park, a \$15,200,000 pool of financing organized by the mayor to spur the development of market rate housing downtown, Slugger Bat Factory and Museum, expansion of the Louisville Science Center (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002), and annual downtown living tours sponsored by Downtown Management District (Karman 2011). Karman and Bittenbender (2001) also reported that the development of LG fit with Mayor Armstrong's initiative to create more housing downtown. The article mentions that diverse neighborhoods are beneficial yet only focuses on the convenience that housing near the medical campus would provide to medical center employees. This stands in support of the housing advocate who asserted that HOPE VI developments are not about the people who lived there because they were rarely, if ever, able to move back.

Several respondents discussed the development in the context of new residential and commercial development nearby. The demolition of Clarksdale had the potential to spur more development by rebranding the area as desirable. A participant involved with the city recognized the impact that the development had: "The changes that LG made to that side of the neighborhood and the way it links to the medical center were a big factor in changing NULU, or creating NULU." Erasing the visible signs of blight made the area more attractive to businesses. Between 2001 and 2013, there were five stories in *Louisville Business First* that mentioned LG in reference to new developments, particularly Gallery Square Lofts, Commonwealth Motorcycles, a downtown animal hospital, the sale of Wayside Christian Mission's properties, the renovation of the Louisville Chemical Building across from LG, and the opening of Gebhardt Marshall Gallery. An additional report quoted the president of Bargain Supply, a long-time staple in the area, about the improvements in the neighborhood over the past ten years (Eigelbach 2011).

News coverage, the grant application, respondent accounts, and data on new businesses in the area are all in agreement that the revitalization of Clarksdale would be beneficial in terms of attracting businesses and indeed was successful. Annual new business start-ups in the 40202 zip code increased from about 125 in 2003 to almost 200 in 2005. There were drops back to about 150 new businesses per year during the Great Recession and increases to near 200 businesses per year beginning in 2010 (Louisville Revenue Commission 2013).

Across interviews, news coverage, and the grant application we see the discussion of spillover. This rhetoric is important because it shows the emphasis given by multiple stakeholders to the potential for impact beyond the immediate territory of development. There are a variety of reasons why spillover is attractive to developers, policy makers, and city officials. Spillover allows for projects to have a broader reach, but more importantly a project with the potential for spillover is more likely to attract more private investment. This is crucial because of the financial constraints faced by local housing authorities and

HUD. At least one participant mentioned that the HOPE VI allocation from HUD is simply not enough, and another participant referred to the process of using the HOPE VI allocation to leverage other funds. Because of the limitations of funding, a site with the potential to draw private investment is crucial in order to change the physical shape of public housing.

PLACE OVER PEOPLE

The manner in which participants discussed the achievement of goals reveals that residents are indeed a secondary concern. Most respondents discussed the streetscape and the mixed-income development; their evaluations did not include whether the individuals that were relocated are better off or even the ways that mixed-income communities are beneficial to low-income individuals. A city representative offered:

Well go out to Park Duvalle and you'll see doctors living there with a \$250,000-\$280,000 home and around the block you'll see a public housing unit. I'd say it works, wouldn't you?

A representative from HUD echoes those sentiments, adding that Park Duvalle eliminated a food desert. Overwhelmingly participants refer to components that can be assessed from simply looking at the developments, which indicates that neighborhood effects frame their assessment of the development. Only one respondent addressed whether former residents are better off. This respondent was critical of the evaluation criteria used by others in this study and asserted that the main goal of HOPE VI is to raise property values and the development at LG has been successful in doing that. This participant recognized that the physical transformation creates visual appeal; however, it does not correlate to an improved standard of life for prerenovated residents.

Census data support the above respondent's assertion and demonstrate the transformation that occurred in LG and the surrounding neighborhood. Census tract 59 spans beyond the immediate territory of Clarksdale/LG, therefore, the changes that occurred are not confined to the rehabilitation site. Rather, it reflects the shift in the neighborhood wherein Clarksdale was located. Before revitalization, the median home value in census tract 59 was \$63,800; postrevitalization, in 2010, that value had increased to \$142,000. Prior to the development of LG there were no homes valued above \$199,999; today 14 percent of the owner-occupied homes are valued between \$200,000 and \$299,999.

Table 2 shows that there were significant changes in gross rent in census tract 59 as well. In 2000, half of the renter-occupied units had rents less than \$200; in 2010, that portion decreased to 32 percent. This change may indicate a loss of public housing units and income requirements of the new development. Individuals receiving subsidies in the new development are required to have jobs and, therefore, the minimum rent paid in LG may be higher than that paid by Clarksdale residents.

Between 2000 and 2010, the number of households in census tract 59 declined sharply from 2,499 to 1,987. There was also a decline in the number of female-headed households from 742 in 2000 to 294 in 2010 (see Table 3). Tract 59 was majority African American before demolition and, while it remained predominantly African American, the percentage of African American residents decreased from 63 percent to 53 percent. There were also increases in the percentage of whites and those who identify as

TABLE 2. Housing Characteristics, Census Tract 59, 2000–2010

	2000		2010	
	N	%	N	%
Owner-occupied Homes	192	100	350	100
Value				
<\$50,000	82	43	27	8
\$50,000–\$99,999	99	52	25	7
\$100,000–\$149,999	6	3	152	43
\$150,000–\$199,999	5	3	97	28
\$200,000–\$299,999	0	0	49	14
Median	\$63,800		\$142,000	
Renter-occupied units	2,258	100	1,528	100
Gross rent				
<\$200	1,139	50	504	32
\$200–\$299	246	11	231	15
\$300–\$499	405	18	271	17
\$500–\$749	386	17	377	24
\$750–\$999	39	2	185	12
\$1,000–\$1,499	9	0.4	0	0
No cash rent	34	1.5		NA
Median	\$195			\$349

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File and 3, 2006–2010 American Community Survey.

multiracial. Reducing minority concentrations is in line with the aims of HOPE VI, and this occurred with the development of LG. The benefits of integrated neighborhoods make this a desirable neighborhood development goal, but it does not necessarily translate into benefits for the people who live there because racial stereotypes and prejudice may still mar interactions (Galster and Booza 2007; Khare et al. 2015; Kurwa 2015).

Census tract 59 was majority low income in 2000, with 52 percent of the households reporting income of less than \$10,000; this figure decreased to 36 percent. Median household income increased from \$9,367 in 2000 to \$15,439 in 2010. Proportionately, the greatest increase occurred in the percentage of households with incomes from \$75,000 to \$200,000, indicating that residents are not developing self-sufficiency but rather the mixed-income objective is being met. Additionally, the percentage of families below the poverty level decreased from 57 percent to 42 percent, the percentage of female-headed households below the poverty level decreased from 74 percent to 67 percent, and the percentage of individuals living in poverty declined from 58 percent to 44 percent. While there was a decrease in poverty, the rate did not go below the threshold for concentrated poverty, therefore, the neighborhood could still be contending with the same negative impacts.

Unemployment decreased substantially from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 4.6 percent in 2010, but there was also a decline in labor participation, suggesting an increase in students living in the area. Educational attainment increased over the period. Surprisingly, however, considering the proximity to the medical center, the percentage of individuals living in the area with graduate and professional degrees actually declined.

CITY & COMMUNITY

TABLE 3. Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics, Census Tract 59, 2000–2010

	2000		2010	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Household type				
Total households	2,495	100	1,987	100
Family households	987	40	462	23
Married-couple family	251	10	122	6
Male householder, no wife present	–	–	46	2
Female householder, no husband	680	27	294	15
Nonfamily households	1,508	60	1,525	77
Race				
White	1,556	31	1,426	38
Black/African American	3,190	63	2,028	53
Other	119	2	101	3
Two or more races	206	4	250	7
Household income*				
<\$10,000		52		36
\$10,000–\$14,999		14		14
\$15,000–\$24,999		10		13
\$25,000–\$34,999		8		12
\$35,000–\$49,999		7		8
\$50,000–\$74,999		8		9
\$75,000–\$99,999		2		5
\$100,000–\$149,999		0		3
\$150,000–\$199,999		0.2		2
Median	\$ 9,367		\$15,439	
Mean	\$23,363		\$28,491	
Employment status				
Population 16+	3,722	100	3,269	100
In labor force	1,806	49	1,440	44
Employed	1,461	39	1,266	39
Unemployed	345	9	151	5
Not in labor force	1,916	51	1,829	56
Poverty rates				
All families		57		42
Female-householder		74		65
Individuals		58		44
Educational attainment				
Population 25 years+	3,087	100	2,639	100
Did not graduate high school		39		23
HS graduate (inc [†] equivalency)		26		30
Some college, no degree		17		22
Associate degree		3		8
Bachelor's degree		9		15
Graduate or professional degree		6		3
Percent HS graduate or higher		61		77
Percent bachelor's degree or higher		15		17

*2010 figures in 2010 inflation-adjusted dollars.

†inc = includes

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, Summary Files 1, 3 and 4, 2006–2010 American Community Survey.

Overall, Table 3 shows that the demographic character of census tract 59 changed noticeably after the demolition/construction of Clarksdale/LG. This may reflect a change in the population served by public housing as suggested by one respondent who stated:

So you asked me if public housing used to serve the poorest of the poor, absolutely, 100%, that is not true anymore. You already heard me talk about it and in one of our reports we actually analyze it and it's worse now than it was about how many units that have been taken away from families and how many of the family units now have these higher income and behavior standards, not behavior so much as income standards than they did before.

This statement reflects concerns about the impact the demolition had on residents. This respondent echoes the concerns of another respondent regarding the loss of housing stock. One-for-one replacement does not translate into the same number of families being served. A HOPE VI development could replace the same number of units but have a higher proportion of one-bedroom units thus serving a different population. In census tract 59 the number of households declined between 2000 and 2010; LG may house fewer families than Clarksdale. The respondent also suggests that the population of LG is more upwardly mobile than the previous population. In order to return to the new development, individuals are required to have a certain income and meet other requirements, such as no history of evictions, which were not obligatory at Clarksdale. Census data support this supposition as well—median income increased from \$9,367 to \$15,439.

HUD's goals of changing the physical shape of public housing and creating mixed-income communities were both manifested in neighborhood development at LG. The fact that Clarksdale was chosen for redevelopment, although there were other sites that were in greater need, reveals that spillover to neighboring areas and economic opportunities were major factors. As a result, there appears to be a correlation between the development of LG and economic growth downtown. Census tract 59 underwent significant demographic change with decreases in population, female-headed households, and poverty rates, increase in income, and change in racial composition. The data already presented suggest that there is a correlation between the development of LG and neighborhood development goals, including increased property values and commercial development, but what impact has this had on the residents who once lived there? While this study cannot explicitly speak to specific outcomes of residents, we show that the majority of Clarksdale residents were not around for the improved neighborhood. Additionally, Walker and Hanchette (2015) found that participants who relocated from Clarksdale experienced residential instability and persistent racial segregation.

Despite efforts to guard against it, there is potential in HOPE VI projects for residents to be displaced. Public housing residents must move, which impacts their daily lives; and they could lose social capital, such as informal childcare or access to public transportation. Individuals may also deal with changing their children's schools, daycare, and longer commutes to work. A comment from one participant perfectly sums up the tension between physical development benefits and the costs to residents:

I think there's just been a lot of policy changes that have had unforeseen consequences on public housing so, it's like you and I could sit down and come up with what we think would be the best housing, public housing model in the world and then there might be some other seemingly unrelated policy that goes into place

elsewhere in the government that would then have an impact on that. So, I think it's all just a big social experiment frankly.

People served by public housing tend to be very low income and may suffer from other issues such as disability; they are what one respondent called the "hardest housed." They are people who may otherwise be homeless; hence it was very important to the housing authority to carry out one-to-one replacement. According to one respondent, individuals in low-income neighborhoods are often members of protected classes:

A protected class is declared to be a protected class because there are hundreds of years of both legal and extralegal disenfranchisement, politically in access to capital, in access to employment, and in access to education. So it's not yippee, I'm in a protected class, God finally somebody is recognizing that we have been excluded from all of these really important systems, and so knowing that it is not, as I always say rocket surgery, to figure out people in many of these protected classes are going to be disproportionately lower income. So where people of low income live becomes a fair housing issue.

This respondent broaches the issue of fair housing. The individuals utilizing public housing tend to be marginalized and muted. Thinking about them as members of protected classes communicates the gravity of their social position and the necessity of caution in the relocation process.

HOPE VI, recognizing the vulnerability of public housing residents to some extent, requires Community and Supportive Services (CSS). At the outset, there was a multiday planning meeting where residents and stakeholders were able to share their concerns. Social workers relayed plans to each family impacted by the redevelopment in order to ensure residents had a complete understanding of what was happening. Additionally, tutoring/mentoring, youth training, GED training, computer classes, and vocational training were offered to residents as a result of a CSS survey (Housing Authority of Louisville 2002). In spite of the fact that various protocols were in place, they did not ensure residents would gain more than they lost by being relocated. One representative from the city acknowledged that residents are given more options, but those options may not be what they want, in particular they may have to move to suburban neighborhoods.

You no longer see Cotter-Lang, you see Park Duvalle. When Cotter-Lang went away and Park Duvalle came in there were hundreds of families displaced. I mean you take away 2000 units and you put in a 1000 units and you think, hmm, where did those other thousand go? And that meant that scattered site housing had to begin. Many residents didn't want to go to scattered sites. They don't want to live out in Fern Creek.

Residents are given choices about where they relocate, but ultimately they must leave the neighborhood where they were located, and in doing so they may end up losing social capital. This representative from the city cites Fern Creek, which is approximately 15 miles southeast of downtown, as a potential destination neighborhood. In moving to neighborhoods such as Fern Creek residents' access to public transportation may be affected. One participant asserted that nearly 80 percent of people who lived in Clarksdale relied on public transportation. Furthermore, moves such as this may disrupt support systems, as discussed by another participant. Residents are faced with moving some place

they have no interest in living and could potentially lose some social capital, and there is no guarantee that these individuals will be left better off.

There are legitimate concerns about the ways in which HOPE VI may negatively impact residents. At the same time that some study participants recognized the potential drawback of HOPE VI, others saw potential for residents to benefit from HOPE VI. According to a representative from HUD, HOPE VI is more than just housing. It's also about creating self-sufficiency.

As you may know public housing's mindset was to just house people and it has moved to more than just bricks and mortar. It's making sure that the recipient has a choice of where they want to live. It's doing more than just providing bricks and mortar; it's helping them. I think the cliché is a hand up versus a hand out. Having some self-sufficiency on a personal level, as a family, incorporating other resources, and leveraging private resources to help a family become more successful in the sense of becoming educated, having support for families to get kids through the educational process. There are even programs helping them understand financial responsibilities, creating bank accounts, and things along those lines. So it's much more comprehensive than just putting them in a tall building and providing a shelter. It's more of helping them become more integrated in the community from a financially disadvantaged perspective.

HUD's requirements and self-sufficiency goals do reflect this shift in policy; however, this study finds that physically housing people is first and foremost HUD's goal. HOPE VI does create a more integrated community to which financially disadvantaged individuals have access. It is important to keep in mind that those with the most access to LG are likely upwardly mobile to some extent and that it is those who are upwardly mobile that will benefit the most from CSS programming.

DISCUSSION

In assessing goals of HOPE VI as implemented in LG, this study revealed that the HOPE VI program values place outcomes over people outcomes. In the eyes of local officials LG was successful because it met the HOPE VI goals of neighborhood development. Whether or not residents benefited was a secondary concern and impact on residents was evaluated in terms of neighborhood effects. The language used by participants and also in the grant application suggests that the main goal of HOPE VI is neighborhood and community development. Most of the participants in the study referred to some kind of neighborhood development benefit as part of the overall plan—they referred to the streetscape or the mixed-income nature of development. Evidence from this study suggests that local decision makers are not usurping HOPE VI projects to achieve their own objectives, rather the stated goals of HOPE VI prioritize neighborhood development over resident self-sufficiency.

The Clarksdale Revitalization plan stated that its goal was to utilize the location of Clarksdale to develop a more livable community for its residents and neighbors (HAL 2002). Changing the built environment and thus neighborhood development were the primary goals of this HOPE VI development. Physical distress, while a primary factor, was not the determining factor for Clarksdale's selection in applying for a HOPE VI grant.

Respondents discussed the poorer conditions at Parkway Place, and crime data revealed that Clarksdale was not the site with the most crime a year before demolition. The main difference between Clarksdale and the other projects that could have been considered was location, particularly proximity to downtown. Downtown Louisville was already experiencing an “urban renaissance,” and the demolition of Clarksdale had great potential to add to and benefit from downtown development goals.

With the emphasis on design we end up with beautiful developments, which may offer better living conditions for low-income individuals. One participant in this study asserted that the main goal of HOPE VI is to raise property values and the data presented here provides credence to that claim. Very few of the original Clarksdale residents moved into LG. Census data show that there were marked changes in the demographic character of census tract 59; therefore, the population served by Clarksdale was very different than the population that inhabits LG. Post-Clarksdale, census tract 59 has fewer female-headed households and African Americans, and the percentage of individuals with incomes below \$10,000 declined. Some of the most fragile people in the community were affected by the demolition of Clarksdale, and some participants in this study expressed concerns that the individuals that were relocated may have lost some social capital, such as social support and access to transportation. While Clarksdale residents were offered first preference for LG, it is important to keep in mind that the individuals allowed to come back to the new development are required to meet, in particular, higher income standards that were not in place at Clarksdale. Thus, those who benefit the most from this HOPE VI initiative are those who were already upwardly mobile to some extent.

We are beginning to see a shift once again in the population served by public housing. The most disadvantaged are still housed, but they are not poised to receive benefits as much as those that are upwardly mobile. The individuals that should benefit the most from self-sufficiency programming are moved to another neighborhood and potentially lose some of their social capital; what do they receive in return? Individuals may or may not be relocated to lower poverty neighborhoods, but as the literature shows this does not always produce the desired effects. Because the primary goal of HOPE VI is neighborhood development, one is left to conclude that HOPE VI is more for cities than for people.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

HOPE VI has been succeeded by Choice Neighborhoods, which maintains HOPE VI’s emphasis on public–private partnerships for assisted housing; however, it is touted as more encompassing. Choice Neighborhoods is organized around three core goals: housing, people, and neighborhoods. The program provides funds for neighborhood improvement projects and seeks partnerships between organizations, agencies, and institutions working on affordable housing (Pendall and Hendley 2013). Choice has retained several elements from HOPE VI, particularly the mixed financing objective. Maintaining the mixed financing objective along with neighborhood and community development goals makes it possible for Choice to prioritize place over people.

Evaluation of early implementation demonstrates that Choice projects vary broadly in terms of neighborhood development goals and ongoing investment in the target sites. Pendall and Hendley (2013) found that most of the target neighborhoods experienced

significant investment between 2000 and 2010. The site selected for redevelopment in Iberville/Tremé, New Orleans, touts more than \$1 billion dollars invested in and around the target site since 2005 compared to Eastern Bayview, San Francisco, with \$8.7 million. Based on this case study, HOPE grant applicants, and by extension, Choice applicants, may choose sites that are marketable because of the competitive grant process and the need to leverage private funds. The selection of Clarksdale and its transformation into Liberty Green was due in part to development in downtown Louisville. And Louisville's efforts to re/develop neighborhoods continue now under the Choice Neighborhoods program. LMHA recently applied for and received a Choice Neighborhood grant for Beecher Terrace, which was described as sound public housing stock at the time of this study. In 2013 Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government allocated \$40,000 to draft a blueprint for Waterfront Park expansion, near Beecher Terrace (Louisville Business First 2013). In 2014, Beecher Terrace was featured on PBS in a Frontline special, "Locked Up in America: Prison State," which documented the high number of residents that are cycled through the criminal justice system; shortly thereafter, LMHA announced plans to redevelop Beecher Terrace. This anecdotal evidence may highlight the role that neighborhood development plays in site selection for Choice Neighborhoods in a similar fashion to HOPE VI.

LIMITATIONS

This study has several important limitations. First, respondents were selected from a limited sample and some decision makers may have remained unidentified; therefore, it is impossible to know if the perspectives of the interviewees reflect those of all decision makers in this case. Furthermore, while this study concludes that neighborhood development was the primary goal of the HOPE VI development at LG, it cannot say whether former residents have prospered or been disadvantaged as a result of this development. Future research should utilize resident interviews or tracking data from LMHA to address the impact demolition/development had on Clarksdale residents. Because this research employed a case study, it cannot be generalized to other HOPE VI developments. Future research should investigate the goals at other HOPE VI sites across the country in order to determine if neighborhood development goals were primary for the HOPE VI program nationally.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Derrick Brooms, Lauren Heberle, and David Imbroscio for comments on this project and to the anonymous reviewers and former editor Hilary Silver for comments on the manuscript.

REFERENCES

- Boston, Thomas D. 2005. "The Effects of Revitalization on Public Housing Residents—A Case Study." *Journal of the American Planning Association* 71(4): 393–407.
- Brooks, Fred, Carole Zugazaga, James Wolk, and Mary Ann Adams. 2005. "Resident Perceptions of Housing, Neighborhood, and Economic Conditions after Relocation from Public Housing Undergoing HOPE VI Redevelopment." *Research on Social Work Practice* 15(6): 481–90.
- Buron, Larry, Christopher Hayes, and Chantal Hailey. 2013. "An Improved Living Environment, but . . ." Brief No. 3. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.

- Buron, Larry, Diane K. Levy, and Megan Gallagher. 2007. "Housing Choice Vouchers: How HOPE VI Families Fared in the Private Market." *Metropolitan Housing and Communities Center* 3:1–12.
- Buron, Larry, Susan Popkin, Diane Levy, Laura Harris, and Jill Khadduri. 2002. *The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
- Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. *Constructing Grounded Theory*. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
- Chaskin, Robert, and Mark L. Joseph. 2013. "'Positive' Gentrification, Social Control, and 'Right to the City' in Mixed-Income Communities: Uses and Expectations of Space and Place." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 37(2):480–502.
- Chaskin, Robert J., and Mark L. Joseph. 2015. *Integrating the Inner City: The Promise and Perils of Mixed-Income Public Housing Transformation*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Cheshire, Paul. 2012. "Why Do Birds of a Feather Flock Together? Social Mix and Social Welfare: A Quantitative Appraisal." In Gary Bridge, Tim Butler, and Loretta Lees (eds.), *Mixed Communities: Gentrification by Stealth?*, pp. 17–24. Chicago: The Policy Press.
- Chetty, Raj, Nathaniel Hendren, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2016. "The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment." *The American Economic Review* 106(4): 855–902.
- Clark, William A.V. 2008. "Reexamining the Moving to Opportunity Study and Its Contribution to Changing the Distribution of Poverty and Ethnic Concentration." *Demography* 45(3):515–35.
- Comey, Jennifer. 2007. *HOPE VI'd and on the Move*. Brief No. 1. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, Metropolitan Housing and Communities Center.
- Crump, Jeff. 2002. "Deconcentration by Demolition: Public Housing, Poverty, and Urban Policy." *Environment and Planning D-Society & Space* 20(5): 581–96.
- Cunningham, Lynn E. 2001. "Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification: Lessons Learned from the D.C. Housing Authority's HOPE VI Projects." *Journal of Affordable Housing & Community Development Law*, 10(4): 353–71.
- Curley, Alexandra M. 2009. "Draining or Gaining? The Social Networks of Public Housing Movers in Boston." *Journal of Social & Personal Relationships* 26(2–3): 227–47.
- Downs, Jere. 2012. "Liberty Green Homes Unveiled in City's Core." *Courier Journal*, March 12. Retrieved April 19, 2013 (<http://search.proquest.com/docview/926921090?accountid=14665>).
- Duryea, Danielle Pelfrey. 2006. "Gendering the Gentrification of Public Housing: HOPE VI's Disparate Impact on Lowest-Income African American Women." *Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy* 13(3): 567–93.
- Eigelbach, Kevin. 2011. "Replacing Clarksdale Project with Liberty Green Has Been a Plus for East Market Neighborhood." *Louisville Business First*, January 21. Retrieved April 19, 2013 (<http://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/print-edition/2011/01/21/replacing-clarksdale-project-with.html>)
- Fraser, James, Ashley Burns, and Deirdre Oakley. 2013. "HOPE VI, Colonization, and the Production of Difference." *Urban Affairs Review* 49(4): 525–56.
- Fraser, James, William Rohe, Shannon Van Zandt, and Chris Warren. 2004. *Report for the Durham Housing Authority*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The Center for Urban and Regional Studies.
- Galster, George, and Jason Booza. 2007. "The Rise of the Bipolar Neighborhood." *Journal of the American Planning Association* 73(4): 421–35.
- Goetz, Edward G. 2003. *Clearing the Way: Deconcentrating the Poor in Urban America*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
- Goetz, Edward G. 2005. "Comment: Public Housing Demolition and the Benefits to Low-Income Families." *Journal of the American Planning Association* 71(4): 407–10.
- Goetz, Edward G. 2010. "Better Neighborhoods, Better Outcomes? Explaining Relocation Outcomes in HOPE VI." *Cityscape* 12(1): 5–31.
- Goetz, Edward G. 2011. "Gentrification in Black and White: The Racial Impact of Public Housing Demolition in American Cities." *Urban Studies* 48(8): 1581–604.
- Goetz, Edward G. 2013. *New Deal Ruins: Race, Economic Justice, and Public Housing Policy*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Harvard Law Review. 2003. "When Hope Falls Short: HOPE VI, Accountability, and the Privatization of Public Housing." *Harvard Law Review* 116(5): 1477–98.
- Housing Authority of Louisville. 2002. *Clarksdale HOPE VI Revitalization Plan*. Louisville, KY: Housing Authority of Louisville.

- Jacob, Brian A. 2004. "Public Housing, Housing Vouchers, and Student Achievement: Evidence from Public Housing Demolitions in Chicago." *The American Economic Review* 94(1): 233–28.
- Joseph, Mark L., Robert J. Chaskin, and Henry S. Webber. 2007. "The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty through Mixed-Income Development." *Urban Affairs Review* 42(3): 369–409.
- Karman III, John R. 2011. "Annual Downtown Living Tour Scheduled for Sept. 17." *Louisville Business First*. September 9, Retrieved April 18, 2013 (<http://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/print-edition/2011/09/09/annual-downtown-living-tour-scheduled.html>)
- Karman III, John R., and Steve Bittenbender. 2001. "Converting Clarksdale." *Louisville Business First*. March 19, Retrieved April 18, 2013. (<http://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/stories/2001/03/19/story2.html>)
- Katz, Bruce. 2009. The Origins of HOPE VI. In Henry G. Cisneros and Lora Engdahl (eds.), *From Despair to Hope: Hope VI and the New Promise of Public Housing in American Cities*, pp. 15–29. Washington, DC.: Brookings Institute Press.
- Keene, Danya, and Arline Geronimus. 2011. "Weathering' HOPE VI: The Importance of Evaluating the Population Health Impact of Public Housing Demolition and Displacement." *Journal of Urban Health* 88(3): 417–35.
- Khare, Amy T., Mark L. Joseph, and Robert J. Chaskin. 2015. "The Enduring Significance of Race in Mixed-Income Developments." *Urban Affairs Review* 51(4):474–503.
- Kingsley, G. Thomas, Jennifer Johnson, and Kathryn L.S. Pettit. 2003. "Patterns of Section 8 Relocation in the HOPE VI Program." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 25(4): 427–47.
- Kurwa, Rahim. 2015. "Deconcentration without Integration: Examining the Social Outcomes of Housing Choice Voucher Movement in Los Angeles." *City & Community* 14(4):364–91.
- Laakso, Janice. 2013. "Flawed Policy Assumptions and HOPE VI." *Journal of Poverty* 17(1):29–46.
- Louisville Business First. 2013. "Planning to Begin on New Phase of Waterfront Park." November 18, Retrieved February 2, 2015 (<http://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/blog/morning-call/2013/11/planning-to-begin-on-new-phase-of.html>)
- Louisville Metro Housing Authority. 2014. "Liberty Green: General Highlights." Retrieved January 14, 2015 (<http://www.lmha1.org/hope-vi/general-highlights.php>)
- Louisville Revenue Commission. "New Tax Accounts." Retrieved April 17, 2013 (<https://www.metrorevenueservices.org/newaccounts/>)
- Lucio, Joanna, Laura Hand, and Flavio Marsiglia. 2014. "Designing Hope: Rationales of Mixed Income Housing Policy." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 36(5): 891–904.
- Ludwig, Jens, Greg J. Duncan, Lisa A. Gennetian, Lawrence F. Katz, Ronald C. Kessler, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Lisa Sanbonmatsu. 2013. "Long-Term Neighborhood Effects on Low-Income Families: Evidence from Moving to Opportunity." *American Economic Review* 103(3): 226–31.
- Manley, David, Maarten van Ham, and Joe Doherty. 2012. "Social Mixing as a Cure for Negative Neighbourhood Effects: Evidence-based Policy or Urban Myth?" In Gary Bridge, Tim Butler, and Loretta Lees (eds.), *Mixed Communities: Gentrification by Stealth?*, pp. 151–68. Chicago: The Policy Press.
- Manzo, Lynne C., Rachel G. Kleit, and Dawn Couch. 2008. "'Moving Three Times Is Like Having Your House on Fire Once': The Experience of Place and Impending Displacement among Public Housing Residents." *Urban Studies* 45(9): 1855–78.
- Oakley, Deidre, James Fraser, and Joshua Bazuin. 2015. "The Imagined Self-Sufficient Communities of HOPE VI: Examining the Community and Social Support Component." *Urban Affairs Review* 51: 726–46
- Oakley, Deirdre, Chandra Ward, Lesley Reid, and Erin Ruel. 2011. "The Poverty Deconcentration Imperative and Public Housing Transformation." *Sociology Compass* 5(9): 824–33.
- Pardee, Jessica W., and Kevin Fox Gotham. 2005. "HOPE VI, Section 8, and the Contradictions of Low-Income Housing Policy." *Journal of Poverty* 9(2): 1–21.
- Pendall, Rolf, and Leah Hendy. 2013. *A Brief Look at the Early Implementation of Choice Neighborhoods*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
- Sampson, Robert J., and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 1999. "Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods." *American Journal of Sociology* 105(3): 603–51.
- Sharkey, Patrick. 2012. "Residential Mobility and the Reproduction of Unequal Neighborhoods." *Cityscape* 14(3):1–24.
- Smith, Janet L. 1999. "Cleaning up Public Housing by Sweeping Out the Poor." *Habitat International* 23(1): 49–62.
- Stal, Georgina Y., and Daniyal M. Zuberi. 2010. "Ending the Cycle of Poverty Through Socio-Economic Integration: A Comparison of Moving to Opportunity (MTO) in the United States and the Bijlmermeer Revival Project in the Netherlands." *Cities* 27: 3–12.

- Stone, Ramona, Alicia Dailey, Anita Barbee, and Dana Patrick. 2011. "Clarksdale HOPE VI Community Supportive Services Program Evaluation. Final Report on: How Do Former Clarksdale Residents Fare after Relocation?" Louisville: Louisville Metro Housing Authority. Retrieved April 20, 2013 (<http://www.metropolitanhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Clarksdale-Report-Final-revised-09062011-with-appendices1.pdf>)
- Tach, Laura M. 2009. "More than Bricks and Mortar: Neighborhood Frames, Social Processes, and the Mixed-Income Redevelopment of a Public Housing Project." *City & Community* 8(3): 269–99.
- U.S. Census Bureau. 2013. "The American Fact Finder." Retrieved July 19, 2013 (<http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml>)
- U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2012. "About HOPE VI." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Retrieved April 4, 2012 (http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/hope6/about)
- Vale, Lawrence. 2013. *Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the Design Politics of Twice-Cleared Communities*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Walker, Margath A., and Carol Hanchette. 2015. "Residents' Experiences in the Aftermath of a HOPE VI Revitalization Project: A Three-Pronged, Grounded Visualization Approach." *Applied Geography* 57: 71–79
- Wilson, William J. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.